Cruise ship attacked by pirates (with pics)
#14
International waters?
Four of those, one on each side should take care of those azzholes...
http://users.rcn.com/sitzkrieg/war/gatlinggun.wmv
Four of those, one on each side should take care of those azzholes...
http://users.rcn.com/sitzkrieg/war/gatlinggun.wmv
#15
Originally Posted by GLH
International waters?
Four of those, one on each side should take care of those azzholes...
http://users.rcn.com/sitzkrieg/war/gatlinggun.wmv
Four of those, one on each side should take care of those azzholes...
http://users.rcn.com/sitzkrieg/war/gatlinggun.wmv
Friggin' gun looks like it's firing a laser beam
Simply awesome
#17
Registered

Joined: Nov 2002
Posts: 708
Likes: 0
From: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
I Beat If They Waved The Stick They Had More, They Could Of Gotten The Liner To Stop And Had Over All Its Goods! At Least They Stopped Rowing So The Gun Man Could Shoot!No Flair Guns?They Work Good In The Movies,The Crew Of The Liner Could Of Sunk That Pirate RowBoat With One Shot! :d
Last edited by JJONES; 11-06-2005 at 10:42 PM.
#19
Those arnt Somalies there New Orleans refugees displaced .
The guy with the Sefer could of stopped the boat with his special powers
The guy with the Sefer could of stopped the boat with his special powers
__________________
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The Only Time You Have To Much Ammo Is When Your Swimming Or On Fire.
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The Only Time You Have To Much Ammo Is When Your Swimming Or On Fire.
#20
Troubled Waters Ahead for Cruise Ships?
Well-armed assailants attacked the cruise ship Seabourn Spirit as it sailed in pirate-infested waters 100 miles off the coast of Somalia on Nov. 5. Although the crew's evasive action prevented the attackers from boarding the ship, the incident serves as a reminder of the notorious attacks against cruise liners in the 1980s -- and raises the possibility that tourist ships once again are at risk.
At the time of the attack, the 440-foot Spirit, owned by the Miami-based Seabourn Cruises and registered in the Bahamas, was on a 16-day cruise from Egypt to Mombassa, Kenya, with about 150 U.S., British and Australian tourists on board. The attackers, who approached the ship in two 25-foot inflatable speedboats, fired automatic weapons and at least two rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the ship. The crew quickly initiated emergency procedures, gathered the passengers in a lounge, changed course and increased speed. After successfully evading the attackers, the ship was diverted to the Seychelles, where U.S. Navy personnel removed one RPG rocket motor. None of the passengers was injured, although one crewmember received slight shrapnel wounds.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported in October that 23 pirate attacks had occurred off the Somali coast since March, a dramatic increase over 2004, when only two attacks were reported. According to the IMB, pirates operating in the area -- most commonly Somali militiamen -- frequently attack cargo ships in an effort to hold the ship for ransom. Because of this, the IMB recommended in June that ships sailing the waters remain at least 50 miles off shore -- although its location did not prevent the attack against the Spirit.
In one recent incident off the Somali coast, pirates seized the U.N.-chartered merchant ship MV Semlow in late June as it carried food aid to Somalia. The pirates, who demanded a $500,000 ransom, held the 10 crewmembers hostage for more than 100 days before releasing them unharmed. During the course of the hijacking, the pirates used the MV Semlow to attack another ship in the area. As a result of the incident, the U.N. temporarily suspended food shipments to Somalia.
Attacks against cruise ships, however, have been extremely rare since the infamous hijackings of the 1980s. In October 1985, hijackers attacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro, killing wheelchair-bound U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Three years later, in July 1988, nine people died during the attack against the Greek liner City of Poros. The Palestinian paramilitary leader Abu Nidal masterminded both attacks.
It is unclear at this point whether the Nov. 5 attack was the work of pirates or terrorists, although it seems a stretch to suggest the crew outmaneuvered a serious terrorist cell -- unless the cell was staging a practice run for a future attack. Because conditions in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region are conducive to terrorist operations, the possibility of al Qaeda or some other group seizing a ship full of hostages must be further examined. Certainly, the Aug. 10 arrest in Turkey of suspected al Qaeda member Luia Sakra -- on charges of planning attacks against Israeli cruise ships -- raises the possibility that jihadists are setting their sights on cruise liners.
Meanwhile, however, modern piracy is becoming a serious threat to commerce and navigation in many parts of the world. Although cruise liners generally do not carry cargo, pirates certainly would be tempted by the cash and jewelry on board -- or by the prospect of holding hundreds of Westerners hostage for a lucrative ransom. If pirates were the perpetrators, then, the Spirit might have been attacked by a group drifting in the sea-lanes, waiting to attack the first ship that came along. On the other hand, a cruise ship's course and itinerary are not difficult to obtain, suggesting the attackers could have had advance knowledge of the ship's course -- and thus planned an attack against the specific ship.
Because cargo vessels in the area are taking precautions against pirate attacks, such as arming crews, pirates could begin to target softer vessels such as cruise ships. The Achille Lauro attack -- carried out by less than 15 hijackers -- proved that a small number of attackers can seize a cruise ship even if they are outnumbered by the passengers and crew.
Since the Achille Lauro hijacking, Western governments have developed procedures for dealing with hostage situations on cruise ships, but such operations are complex and dangerous for the hostages. In addition, hostage rescue teams (HRTs) trained to respond to situations on cruise ships might not be readily available where the ship is seized. In the case of an attack intended to kill tourists, rather than take hostages, it is unlikely that an HRT could react in time.
At the very least, the Seabourn Spirit incident serves as a warning that cruise ships could be venturing into troubled waters.
Well-armed assailants attacked the cruise ship Seabourn Spirit as it sailed in pirate-infested waters 100 miles off the coast of Somalia on Nov. 5. Although the crew's evasive action prevented the attackers from boarding the ship, the incident serves as a reminder of the notorious attacks against cruise liners in the 1980s -- and raises the possibility that tourist ships once again are at risk.
At the time of the attack, the 440-foot Spirit, owned by the Miami-based Seabourn Cruises and registered in the Bahamas, was on a 16-day cruise from Egypt to Mombassa, Kenya, with about 150 U.S., British and Australian tourists on board. The attackers, who approached the ship in two 25-foot inflatable speedboats, fired automatic weapons and at least two rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the ship. The crew quickly initiated emergency procedures, gathered the passengers in a lounge, changed course and increased speed. After successfully evading the attackers, the ship was diverted to the Seychelles, where U.S. Navy personnel removed one RPG rocket motor. None of the passengers was injured, although one crewmember received slight shrapnel wounds.
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported in October that 23 pirate attacks had occurred off the Somali coast since March, a dramatic increase over 2004, when only two attacks were reported. According to the IMB, pirates operating in the area -- most commonly Somali militiamen -- frequently attack cargo ships in an effort to hold the ship for ransom. Because of this, the IMB recommended in June that ships sailing the waters remain at least 50 miles off shore -- although its location did not prevent the attack against the Spirit.
In one recent incident off the Somali coast, pirates seized the U.N.-chartered merchant ship MV Semlow in late June as it carried food aid to Somalia. The pirates, who demanded a $500,000 ransom, held the 10 crewmembers hostage for more than 100 days before releasing them unharmed. During the course of the hijacking, the pirates used the MV Semlow to attack another ship in the area. As a result of the incident, the U.N. temporarily suspended food shipments to Somalia.
Attacks against cruise ships, however, have been extremely rare since the infamous hijackings of the 1980s. In October 1985, hijackers attacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro, killing wheelchair-bound U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Three years later, in July 1988, nine people died during the attack against the Greek liner City of Poros. The Palestinian paramilitary leader Abu Nidal masterminded both attacks.
It is unclear at this point whether the Nov. 5 attack was the work of pirates or terrorists, although it seems a stretch to suggest the crew outmaneuvered a serious terrorist cell -- unless the cell was staging a practice run for a future attack. Because conditions in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region are conducive to terrorist operations, the possibility of al Qaeda or some other group seizing a ship full of hostages must be further examined. Certainly, the Aug. 10 arrest in Turkey of suspected al Qaeda member Luia Sakra -- on charges of planning attacks against Israeli cruise ships -- raises the possibility that jihadists are setting their sights on cruise liners.
Meanwhile, however, modern piracy is becoming a serious threat to commerce and navigation in many parts of the world. Although cruise liners generally do not carry cargo, pirates certainly would be tempted by the cash and jewelry on board -- or by the prospect of holding hundreds of Westerners hostage for a lucrative ransom. If pirates were the perpetrators, then, the Spirit might have been attacked by a group drifting in the sea-lanes, waiting to attack the first ship that came along. On the other hand, a cruise ship's course and itinerary are not difficult to obtain, suggesting the attackers could have had advance knowledge of the ship's course -- and thus planned an attack against the specific ship.
Because cargo vessels in the area are taking precautions against pirate attacks, such as arming crews, pirates could begin to target softer vessels such as cruise ships. The Achille Lauro attack -- carried out by less than 15 hijackers -- proved that a small number of attackers can seize a cruise ship even if they are outnumbered by the passengers and crew.
Since the Achille Lauro hijacking, Western governments have developed procedures for dealing with hostage situations on cruise ships, but such operations are complex and dangerous for the hostages. In addition, hostage rescue teams (HRTs) trained to respond to situations on cruise ships might not be readily available where the ship is seized. In the case of an attack intended to kill tourists, rather than take hostages, it is unlikely that an HRT could react in time.
At the very least, the Seabourn Spirit incident serves as a warning that cruise ships could be venturing into troubled waters.




